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Our previous work linked orienting and preference deci-­
sion making by revealing a particular gaze behavior when 
observers chose the stimulus they liked in a two-­alternative 
forced-­choice task (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 
2003). Namely, whenever observers were asked to make 
a preference decision as naturally as possible, a continu-­
ally increasing gaze bias toward the eventual choice was 
observed. This effect was not present in the case of con-­
trolled nonpreference tasks, and its size increased with task 
difficulty—as if the brain needed a stronger gaze signal 
to make a more difficult decision. We accounted for the 
behavior by postulating a positive feedback loop between 
the structures responsible for decision making on the one 
hand and the areas controlling orienting on the other. If 
we imagine that the more we look at a stimulus, the more 
we like it, according to the well-­known process of mere 
exposure (Kunst-­Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Moreland & Za-­
jonc, 1977, 1982; Zajonc, 1968), and that we look longer 
at stimuli we like (Birch, Shimojo, & Held, 1985; Fantz, 
1964), we realize that the formation of preference could be 
strongly modulated by gaze.
It thus seems that orienting assists cognition in making 
preference decisions, with the feedback loop described 
earlier driving the decision signal above a possible de-­
cision threshold (Shimojo et al., 2003). Shimojo et al.’s 
study eliminated alternative causes for this behavior and 
provided strong evidence in favor of the proposed model. 
However, orienting is regarded as a novelty detector and is 
usually linked to the presence of salient features in the rel-­
evant stimuli. Using a gaze-­contingent window (peephole) 
paradigm, we have already shown that holistic stimulus 
processing is not necessary for the cascade effect to hap-­
pen (Simion & Shimojo, 2006). In the Simion and Shimojo 
study, observers could inspect the stimuli only through a 
small, gaze-­contingent window; they then had to choose 
the stimulus they liked. Therefore, they had to actively use 
their gaze to gather information about the stimuli. Natu-­
rally, the rate at which observers accumulated visual infor-­
mation was much slower, and the cascade effect was much 
longer (7 sec) than in the 2003 experiments. This result 
supported the claim that the brain integrates gaze informa-­
tion over time and makes a decision only after a threshold 
has been passed. Additionally, this result showed that ori-­
enting could be entirely memory (and intention) driven, 
independent of stimulus perception.
Our main claim is that orienting has been incorporated 
into the mechanism of preference decisions, and its biases 
contribute to decision making; this claim is similar to what 
Damasio proposed in the well-­known somatic marker hy-­
pothesis (Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 
1996). An interesting question, therefore, is whether the 
process of decision making, once started, can be disrupted 
by interfering with the gaze behavior with which it is in-­
trinsically connected. Additionally, none of our previous 
experiments distinguished preference formation from the 
actual state of liking a particular stimulus; this state could 
have been developing unconsciously before the actual 
choice was made and thus could have driven the cascade 
effect. The present study was designed to address both of 
these issues.
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Most systematic studies of human decision making approach the subject from a cost analysis point of view 
and assume that people make the highest utility choice. Very few articles investigate subjective decision making, 
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Specifically, observers were asked to choose the more 
attractive face from a pair. The stimulus presentation 
time was set by a computerized random-­number genera-­
tor. In some trials, therefore, the observers were able to 
make a decision before the stimulus was removed from 
their visual field, whereas in others, the observers had 
to make the choice after the stimulus had disappeared 
and they were left gazing at a blank screen. The former 
situation enabled investigation of gaze behavior after a 
decision had been made but while the stimuli were still 
on the presentation screen, thus separating the pre-­ and 
postdecision states. If the general state of liking a par-­
ticular stimulus (e.g., a human face) were triggering or 
maintaining the cascade effect, we should have observed 
an increasing or stable gaze bias even after the decision 
had been made, especially since observers were then con-­
scious of their preference. In contrast, if the cascade ef-­
fect were maximized at the decision point, after which the 
gaze bias decreased, then we would link the effect to the 
process of decision.
The trials in which the faces disappeared from the 
screen before the observers could choose allowed us to 
investigate the interruption of the natural course of the 
gaze bias. Obviously, a decision still had to be made 
after the stimuli were no longer present, so the orienting 
behavior in those trials would tell us to what extent the 
cascade could be disrupted. Studying this disruption was 
especially important, since after stimulus offset there was 
no visual target to orient to anymore; orienting was thus 
decoupled from its original purposes of novelty detection 
and information gathering, as described by Sokolov and 
others (Porges, 1995; Posner, Pothbart, & Digirolamo, 
1999; Sokolov, 1963, 1990). One possibility is that the 
decision could be based on the gaze bias that developed 
before the end of visual stimulation; in this case, we would 
see a cascade, albeit of smaller magnitude, locked to the 
display-­off moment. Another possibility is that the mech-­
anism, once started, had to be completed, so we would 
observe a cascade effect even after stimulus offset. This 
latter prediction would provide direct evidence for our 
earlier claim that orienting detaches from its initial pur-­
pose of attending to salient features of relevant stimuli and 
is incorporated into the mechanism of decision making to 
the point that the orienting process has to be completed 
before a decision can be made.
MethOd
Six naive observers participated in this experiment after their 
written consent was obtained; they were paid $5 for their participa-­
tion. All were students (undergraduate or graduate) at the California 
Institute of Technology; their mean age was 26.8 years. Each ob-­
server was presented with a unique set of n 5 40 pairs of computer-­
 generated human faces; there were thus a total of 240 face pairs, with 
20 female and 20 male pairs in each set. Only faces of the same gen-­
der were paired. The face generation software was provided by Face-­
gen (Singular Inversions, Vancouver, BC). Prior to the eye-­tracking 
experiment, observers rated each face in the presentation set on a 
scale from 1 (very unattractive) to 7 (very attractive). A MATLAB 
script performed the pairing of the faces by adjoining only faces 
with similar, if not identical, ratings. To limit the effect of familiar-­
ity, faces were presented very briefly (500 msec) in this prelimi-­
nary test. In the eye-­tracking phase, observers’ eye movements were 
tracked with Eyelink 2 (SR Research Ltd., Osgoode, ON) at 500 Hz 
sampling rate, pupil-­tracking mode. Face pairs were presented on a 
CRT computer screen for a random amount of time, according to a 
MATLAB script that drew the time values from a normal distribu-­
tion with a mean of 2,700 msec and a standard deviation of 1.0 sec. 
The minimum and maximum presentation times were 800 msec and 
5,000 msec, respectively. The actual mean presentation time for the 
240 face pairs (across all observers) was 3,105 msec.
Observers were asked to choose the more attractive face in each 
pair. They were informed that the presentation time would be random 
but were instructed to make a natural, unrushed decision if possible. 
If the faces were still on the screen at decision time (as in 128 out of 
240 trials, called early decision), observers pressed one of two buttons 
to indicate their choice (face on the left or face on the right). After 
stimulus offset, they confirmed their decision by pressing the button 
again. Observers were instructed that they were allowed to change 
their minds, but in only 1 out of 240 trials did this actually happen. If 
the faces were taken off the screen before the observers could make 
a decision (as in 112 out of 240 trials, dubbed late decision), they 
needed to make a decision (by pressing one of the two choice buttons) 
while the screen stayed blank. The trials were terminated by the final 
buttonpress (decision confirmation or decision, respectively).
Faces on the screen were presented side by side, one on the left 
and one on the right. They were presented as jpeg images spanning 
400 3 400 pixels, or approximately 17 3 17 deg/visual angle each.
The gaze likelihood analysis developed elsewhere (Shimojo et al., 
2003) was used. We assigned to each time sample point a value of 1 
if the gaze was on the chosen face, a 0 if the gaze was on the uncho-­
sen face, or a NaN (not a number) otherwise. The likelihood that the 
chosen face was inspected at time t was thus obtained by averaging 
across all trials (N 5 240) and observers. The analysis was performed 
by aligning trials at various relevant events, such as decision, final 
buttonpress, or the moment of stimulus offset. Because trial duration 
varied greatly, samples close to the reference events were averaged 
across a larger number of trials than were samples farther away from 
them. This is why each analysis (see Figures 1–3) included a limited 
number of time sample points, with the number of points arbitrarily 
chosen to allow averaging across two thirds of the total trials of that 
experimental condition. NaN values were assigned to samples be-­
longing to saccades and fixations outside of the two faces. Saccades 
accounted for about 13% of all samples, and fixations outside the 
two stimulus faces accounted for another 3%. Eliminating the NaN 
values from the analysis did not change the general profile of the 
likelihood curves. The significance threshold method described in 
Simion and Shimojo (2006) was used to identify the start point of 
a cascade effect. In essence, the significance threshold at each time 
sample point is the minimum percentage of tosses that would render 
a coin toss unfair, given a number of tosses equal to the number of 
trials used to make a likelihood average at that sample point. A gaze 
cascade effect was defined as the portion of the curve that passed the 
significance threshold and never returned below it while keeping a 
monotonically increasing profile.
To analyze the gaze behavior after stimulus offset, only gaze data 
occurring during the blank screen period were included in the likeli-­
hood calculation. The interest areas were defined as the areas previously 
occupied by the faces, and the same algorithm described above was 
used. To ensure that any effects were not due to the behavior trailing off 
from the period when the stimuli were still on the screen, we analyzed 
only those trials that had at least 300 msec of blank time. All likelihood 
curves were fitted with four-­parameter sigmoid functions, with base-­
line, slope, elevation, and sigmoid midpoint as the relevant parameters.
ReSultS
As mentioned in the Method section, the stimulus pre-­
sentation time in each trial was randomly drawn from a 
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normal distribution. The actual mean presentation time 
was 3,101 msec (SD 5 1,205 msec). Obviously, the trials 
in which observers had enough time to decide (early deci-­
sion trials) were clustered toward the longer presentation 
times, with a mean of 3,545 msec (SD 5 1,028 msec). 
The mean decision time in these trials was 2,395 msec 
(SD5 846 msec). In the early decision trials, observers 
had to confirm their decisions after the display was off by 
pressing their choice buttons again. The mean blank time 
(i.e., between the offset of the stimuli and the buttonpress) 
was 1,125 msec (SD 5 584 msec).
The trials that were too short for a decision to be made 
while the faces were on the screen were called late decision 
trials. Presentation time in these trials was shorter, with a 
mean of 2,621 msec (SD 5 1,177 msec). The difference 
in presentation times between early decision and late de-­
cision trials was significant ( p , .001), as expected. The 
mean decision time was 3,455 msec (SD 5 1,230 msec), 
again significantly higher than the mean for early deci-­
sion trials ( p , .0001). Due to the nature of our division 
of trials into the two categories, we consider these num-­
bers to have little relevance to the overall conclusions of 
this study. The mean blank time in this case was 830 msec 
(SD5 609 msec), significantly shorter than the mean in 
the early decision trials ( p 5 .0002). This comparison is 
important because the blank screen period underlies func-­
tionally distinct phenomena, namely decision confirma-­
tion in the early decision trials and the decision itself in the 
late decision trials. The only common feature between the 
two types of trials was the motor action (buttonpress) that 
ended the trial. It might be surprising that confirming a 
decision took longer than making a decision after stimulus 
offset, but we have to point out that in the late decision tri-­
als, unlike in the early decision trials, the observers were 
still under pressure to make their choice.
To investigate the orienting behavior in this task, we 
generated gaze likelihood curves using the gaze analy-­
sis method described in a previous study (Shimojo et al., 
2003). The gaze likelihood curve for the early decision 
trials, aligned at the moment of decision, is plotted against 
time in Figure 1. The time axis extends from 2.5 sec be-­
fore to 1.0 sec after decision, because the gaze behav-­
ior after the choice had been made but before the faces 
had disappeared from the screen was of particular inter-­
est for the purpose of the present study. This postdeci-­
sion period lasted a mean of 1,184 msec across all trials 
(SD5 784 msec). The presence of a normal cascade ef-­
fect starting 1 sec before the decision would be consistent 
with our previous claim that the gaze bias is a prerequisite 
for decision making. Moreover, the postdecision behavior 
eliminates the possibility that the bias is due to the general 
state of liking a particular stimulus. As can be seen, the 
bias decreases significantly after decision, when subjects 
are aware of their preference. We conclude, therefore, that 
the gaze cascade is not a consequence but rather a part of 
the process that leads to preference decisions.
Since orienting is classically linked to the presence of 
visual stimulation, we examined the gaze behavior locked 
to the moment of stimulus offset (the display-­off mo-­
ment). Figure 2 shows the likelihood curve as a function 
of time before and after the stimulus offset, for both early 
and late decision trials. In the case of the former, we notice 
a bias toward choice before the reference point, which was 
expected since the actual decision took place prior to it. It 
is important to note that a classic gaze cascade effect is not 
observed, but this is a direct consequence of aligning the 
data at stimulus offset rather than at decision. Both likeli-­
hood curves are much noisier after the stimulus offset, due 
to the reduced number of data points to average across 
(i.e., increased number of NaNs; see Method section).
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Figure 1. Gaze likelihood curve locked at the decision moment 
in early decision trials. the solid line represents a four-parameter 
sigmoid fit. the horizontal line corresponds to the unbiased in-
spection level (50%). the vertical line corresponds to the decision 
moment, to which all trials were aligned. R2 5 .75. Note that the 
likelihood goes down after the decision.
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Figure 2. Gaze behavior around stimulus offset. the solid line 
represents early decision trials; the dashed line, late decision tri-
als. the vertical line represents the reference point (display off). 
the horizontal line corresponds to the level of unbiased inspec-
tion (50%).
594	 	 	 	 Simion and Shimojo
In the early decision trials, the likelihood curve does not 
display a consistent gaze bias after stimulus offset. The 
case of the late decision trials, however, is more interest-­
ing. There is no clear gaze cascade before the moment of 
stimulus offset, but we notice a gaze bias (58%) toward 
the eventual choice, so we have reason to believe that we 
interrupted the gaze cascade effect. There is also a hint of 
a continuation of the bias after the reference point, which 
prompts further analysis of the gaze behavior during the 
poststimulus period in the late decision trials.
The likelihood curves after stimulus offset are presented 
in Figure 3, plotted against time to the final buttonpress 
for both early and late decision trials. The reader should 
note that in this analysis, the gaze data after stimulus offset 
were aligned at the moment of the final buttonpress, not at 
the point of stimulus offset, as illustrated in Figure 2. This 
is why the curves look entirely different. Only the trials 
in which at least 300 msec separated stimulus offset from 
buttonpress are included in the analysis, to avoid any trail-­
ing off of the gaze behavior from the epoch during which 
the stimuli were still on the screen.
We notice a shorter (approximately 400 msec) but clear 
cascade effect in the late decision trials, as expected in light 
of our model and since observers had to make a decision. 
In contrast, results from the early decision trials display a 
shorter and smaller gaze bias with a plateau-­like shape, sug-­
gesting internal consistency between the motor action and 
orienting, a reappearing result from our past studies (Shi-­
mojo et al., 2003; Simion & Shimojo, 2006). The important 
point is that the curves are significantly different, in terms 
of both profile and magnitude. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
test confirmed the difference (d 5 0.43, p , .001). The re-­
sult again provides strong evidence that orienting is embed-­
ded in the mechanism of preference decision making and 
shows that once started, this contribution process has to be 
completed before a choice can be made.
dISCuSSION
Before we begin this section, we will comment on a 
question that most likely will arise in our readers’ minds: 
How do we know that the final buttonpress (choice) coin-­
cides with the actual decision, which may be internal? As 
a reply, we point out that we view decision making as the 
entire process, from the moment of stimulus onset to the 
moment of buttonpress, given the experiment’s instruc-­
tions. Whether an internal decision is made at some point 
in a trial requires an empirical observation and is difficult 
to pinpoint. In fact, every saccade that we make can be 
considered a decision, but this is not the subject of our 
investigation. Our observers were instructed to press the 
button as soon as they made their decision, so we consider 
choice to be the only reliable indicator of decision making 
in the present study.
Here we investigated, with a single experimental setup, 
a few aspects of the contribution of orienting to prefer-­
ence decision making; the results significantly expand 
and strengthen the implications of our previous conclu-­
sions. The gaze behavior in the early decision trials (Fig-­
ure 1) first confirmed our earlier findings, showing that 
whenever a decision of preference is involved, a cascade 
effect precedes the choice by approximately 1 sec. Sec-­
ond, the fact that the likelihood of inspecting the chosen 
face decreases after the decision moment argues against 
a simple, one-­directional view on the gaze bias—namely, 
that it is generated by preferential looking alone (i.e., we 
tend to look more at what we like) or by the state of lik-­
ing a particular stimulus itself. We note here that, in light 
of this result, our positive feedback loop account needs 
a slight modification, which does not alter our general 
conclusions. A model that holds that the more we look 
at a stimulus, the more we like it, and the more we like 
a stimulus, the more we look at it (Shimojo et al., 2003) 
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Figure 3. Gaze behavior after stimulus offset, locked at the moment 
of final buttonpress. late decision (o) and early decision (x) trials are 
shown. Solid lines represent four-parameter sigmoid fits. R2 5 .95 for 
late decision trials and R2 5 .73 for early decision trials. the curves rep-
resent behavior occurring exclusively after the stimulus offset.
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suggests a cascade effect continuing indefinitely, even 
after the decision, which is a result that we did not obtain. 
However, the only adjustment that the model requires is to 
posit that the positive feedback loop acts only on the still 
unconscious decision signal, bringing the signal closer to 
the moment of overt choice.
The likelihood curve locked at the stimulus offset point 
(display-­off moment, Figure 2) in the late decision trials 
confirmed that our experimental setup was successful in 
interrupting what we think is the natural process of pref-­
erence formation, which involves a gaze cascade effect. 
The dashed curve in Figure 2 shows a significant bias to-­
ward the eventually chosen stimulus, oscillating around 
the 58% level. However, the decision signal is probably 
not strong enough yet for the choice to be made and this is 
why the observers had to complete it after that point.
The most important result of the present study, how-­
ever, comes from the analysis of the orienting behavior 
after stimulus offset (Figure 3). As surprising as it sounds, 
observers completed the gaze cascade by fixating in the 
locations previously occupied by the faces for at least 
830 msec, on average. We emphasize here the irrelevance 
of stimulus presence to the cascade effect itself, as long 
as a preference decision needs to be made. In a previous 
study (Simion & Shimojo, 2006), we showed that mental 
feature integration, without holistic perception, is enough 
for the gaze cascade to happen—again, as long as a prefer-­
ence choice was involved. Orienting and the presence of 
salient stimulus features were only weakly coupled in that 
experiment, since gaze had to be guided by the observ-­
ers’ memory and by compliance with the task’s purpose. 
Among other results, that experiment seemed to indicate 
that orienting became so embedded in the process of deci-­
sion making that stimulus presence was no longer nec-­
essary for triggering it, contrary to what Sokolov (1963) 
described. In our view, the result from the period after 
stimulus offset in the present study is evidence that the 
decoupling between orienting and the stimuli it is sup-­
posed to detect can be complete. In a flowery description, 
we say that orienting has been hijacked by the preference 
decision mechanisms and was used to assist the brain in 
reaching the overt choice. The gaze bias effectively in-­
duces a preference bias.
The difference between the gaze likelihood curves in 
the early and late decision trials in Figure 3 is also in-­
formative. First, this difference shows that a decision is 
the necessary endpoint of a gaze cascade effect. Second, 
it argues against the possibility that the cascade effect is 
just a confirmation of a previously made decision, a point 
of criticism for our earlier results. If this were the case, 
the two curves should be similar, since the situation in 
the early decision trials (represented by crosses in Fig-­
ure 3) is precisely a decision confirmation. The smaller 
bias toward choice (200 msec before buttonpress) in these 
trials is also consistent with our earlier findings, which 
indicated that any selection was generally preceded by a 
gaze bias, probably for internal, cognitive–motor consis-­
tency. The distinction between a selection bias and a gaze 
cascade effect is a reappearing theme in our studies, but 
all the evidence indicates that gaze behavior in subjective, 
emotionally charged decisions goes beyond simple selec-­
tion bias due to the positive feedback loop between mere 
exposure and preferential looking.
Taken together, the results of this study nicely complete 
our story, providing definitive evidence that orienting has 
been incorporated into the process of preference forma-­
tion. Our research also suggests that by manipulating ac-­
tive orienting even after visual stimulation has been inter-­
rupted, we can influence observers’ preferences, an idea 
with endless potential in advertising, social psychology, 
and human communication sciences.
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